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ADMISSIBILITY OF COMPULSORY
BLOOD ALCOHOL TESTS
By WILLIAM DONALD PIERCY
The Need for Presumptive Evidence
The blood alcohol test was developed in the interests of public safety
for the purpose of facilitating the prosecution of drunk-drivers. Because
intoxication is a transient condition and is a matter of degree, rather than
an absolute state, the prosecution of this offense generally has been very
difficult. The available evidence rarely amounts to more than that given
by witnesses who are willing to testify to their opinion of the defendant's
condition. It is a patent fact that eyewitness accounts are frequently in-
accurate, and a clever defense counselor is often able to impeach a witness
who is not positive of everything he saw
Defendant testimony which admits to "having a couple of beers," but
denies being unduly influenced by the alcohol presents the state with an
often insurmountable problem of proof. Likewise, in the case of a collision
where one of the drivers is cited for drunken driving, the prosecutor may
not have the evidence to suitably counter a defense claim that the appear-
ance of intoxication was actually a manifestation of shock resulting from
the accident. Conclusive and reliable proof is seldom had in these cases.
This is perhaps the primary reason for the development of the several
chemical tests by which the level of intoxication may be determined.
The Physiological Basis
Because of differences in absorbtion and elimination rates, persons react
differently to equal quantities of alcohol. Once the alcohol has been ab-
sorbed into the blood stream and has reached the brain, however, all per-
sons react substantially the same to a like amount of alcohol in the blood.
Quantitative analysis of the brain itself represents the ideal test of intoxi-
cation, but, since this is not possible, the blood analysis test offers a highly
accurate alternative.'
Chemical tests based upon an alcoholic analysis of various body sub-
stances such as urine, spinal fluid, saliva and respired air2 are frequently
used, but because of the relatively indirect relationship between these sub-
stances and the brain, the results cannot so precisely depict the actual de-
gree of inebriation as can the blood alcohol test.'
The distinction between the blood test and other common chemical tests
1 For a general discussion, see 14 Mn. L. REv. 111 (1954).
2 Devices which analyze respired air (e.g., the Drunkometer, Alcometer, and Intoximeter
units) are n widespread usage by progressive police departments. This popularity is attributed
to the inherent practical advantages of the breath analysis test: (1) the examination need not
be administered by a doctor (unlike the blood test), (2) a minimum of training is required
in the use of the machines; (3) the machines are portable and may be carried in patrol cars;
(4) the test offers little possibility of embarrassment (unlike the urinalysis examination), and
(5) the results of the test are quickly ascertainable, since a laboratory analysis need not be made.
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is not limited only to the accuracy of the results. In the former, the collec-
tion of the required body substance involves a techmcal "invasion of the
body" which may, or may not, be privileged by consent. The collection of
urine and breath samples, however, may be accomplished without this
"invasion," since these substances are externally accessible. This distinc-
tion will be more fully treated in subsequent discussion.
Prima Facie Evidence of Intoxication
When research and experience established that alcoholic analysis of the
blood offered an accurate and consistent means of measuring the effects of
liquor upon the person, a new and unique tool was placed at the disposal
of the police and the courts. Arbitrary limits were set to simplify the evalu-
ation of the tests and have evolved to the generally accepted scale which
is here presented:4
Under .05% alcohol (by weight)-average person is not influenced.
.05% to .15% alcohol (by weight)--questionable.
.15 % and over alcohol (by weight)-average person is influenced.
Upon recommendation of the National Safety Council, approximately
one-third of the states5 have passed statutes which not only provide for the
reception of evidence obtained through blood alcohol tests, but designate
the results as being prima facie evidence' of the degree of alcoholic influ-
ence. This provision results in a much more efficient trial, although, with
the exception of availability of evidence, the end result is the same as in
other states which require an expert witness to establish the degree of in-
fluence. The jury need not consider opinion evidence; the legislators have
already done that for them. When the laboratory analyst testifies to the
alcoholic content in the blood, the level of intoxication is automatically set
and the burden of showing non-influence is placed upon the defendant.
Admissibility of Evidence
In its efforts to keep pace with a changing society, the law is forced to
advance more slowly and carefully in its new procedures. Nearly every
modification in substance or procedure which affects personal rights and
privileges must, at some time, stand the test of Constitutional inquiry Ad-
missibility of body fluid analyses have been no different; their legality
3 Possible error m urnalyses may result from the case where a person who is sober, but
who had recently been drinking, is examined. A high concentration of alcohol in the urine does
not necessarily indicate present intoxication.
The breath tests, although not subject to as severe criticism in this respect, may be invali-
dated by a claim that the defendant "belched" into the collecting device, thus causing a rela-
tively highly concentrated volume of stomach gas to be mtermixed with the less concentrated
respired air from the lungs.
4 C. W. Muehlberger, Medicolegal Aspects of Chemical Tests of Alcoholic Intoxication,
39 J. CRan. L. & CRim. 411 (1948).
5 37 MASS. L. Q. (4) 10, 16 (1952).
6 For examples, see N.Y. Vm-crz AND TRamsc LAWS § 70 (5), WIs. STAT. § 53.13 (2) (1951).
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has been questioned on grounds of alleged violations of Constitutional
guarantees.
Objection via Self-incriminaton
The most notable challenge to the new evidence has come up under the
problem of self-incrimination.7 The claim that, compelling an accused per-
son to offer evidence against himself conflicts with his basic rights is not a
new issue in the history of law'
As a result of careful study on the development of the privilege, Wig-
more observes that the purpose of the rule was to guard against the possi-
bility of untrustworthy evidence and that it applied only to verbal and
written testimony which was elicited through compulsion.9 Justice Holmes
stated in his opinion in Holt v. U.S.,10 that the privilege only protects the
individual against physically or morally compelled testimony and does not
provide for the exclusion of a person's body as evidence when it is material
to the case. "Evidence of this nature," he continued, "is admssible whether
voluntary or not, if material."
The decisions have generally been in accord with this view Hence, in
numerous cases, damaging evidence was required from the defendant over
objection that this was compulsory self-incrimination. In landmark de-
cisions, fingerprints1 and photographs 2 taken without consent have been
admitted in evidence, persons have been required to exhibit themselves
before the court, 13 to display tattoos 4 and other special marks, and in some
cases the defendants have been required to perform certain acts such as
trying on clothing to see if it fits'5 or to demonstrate their voice character-
istics.', In at least one case of alleged drunkenness, the defendant was
ordered to submt to a medical examination, and the resulting evidence was
used against him at the trial.' In many cases, the defendant has been re-
quired to submit to other physical examnations.'8
Because the privilege against self-incrimination may be waived, little
difficulty has been encountered in adjudging those cases where consent of
7 The U.S. Constitution, Fifth Amendment, reads m part that "No person shall be
compelled m any criminal case to be a witness against himself " State constitutions have
similar provisons.
8 Fred E. Inbau, Self-Incrzmination, 28 J. Caim. L. & C.mI. 261 (1937).
9 8 WIomOPE, EVIDENCE § 2263 (3d ed. 1940).
10 Holt v. U.S., 218 U.S. 245 (1910).
1 People v. Jones, 112 Cal.App. 68, 296 Pac. 317 (1931), People v. Sallow, 100 Misc. 447,
165 N.Y.S. 915 (1917). Also see annotation in 83 A.L.R. 127.
12 Shaffer v. U.S., 24 D.C.App. 417 (1904), cert. den., 196 U.S. 639 (1905). A sound movie
was used in People v. Hayes, 21 Cal.App. 320, 71 P.2d 321 (1937).
13 People v. Oliveria, 127 Cal. 376, 59 Pac. 772 (1899), People v. Goldenson, 76 Cal. 328,
19 Pac. 161 (1888). Also see annotation in 171 A.L.R. 127.
14 State v. Ah Chuey, 14 Nev. 79, 33 Am. Rep. 530 (1879).
15 See note 10 supra; see also annotation in 18 A.L.R.2d 796.
16 See annotation in 16 A.L.R.2d 1322.
17 Green Lake County v. Domes, 247 Wis. 90, 18 N.W.2d 348 (1945).
I8 See annotations in 164 A.L.R. 967 and 25 A.L.R.2d 1407.
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the defendant may be demonstrated."9 Even where the defendant submitted
to a test because he thought it was required by law, the court found his
consent waived the claim of compelled self-incrimination.20 This waiver
has been astutely extended to cover those cases where the defendant was
unconscious and could not object to the gathering of specimens; the courts
have consistently ruled that this evidence was not compelled.21
A departure from this rule appears in the disputed case of Apodaca v.
State,2 a 1940 Texas decision, where a compulsory urinalysis was held to
be a violation of the defendant's guarantee against self-incrimination.
The cases indicate that the view taken by Holmes and Wigmore, supra,
represents the prevailing attitude of the courts m regard to requiring a
defendant to perform acts which may tend to incriminate him. When it
comes to the matter of required submission to certain tests, however, the
courts which have sat in judgment on the issue of self-incrimination have
displayed a singular disinclination to decisively hold that this guarantee
does not, and cannot, apply to any cases except where testimonial compul-
sion is present.
Objection via Unreasonable Search and Seizure
Although the issue of self-incrimination has been the standard consti-
tutional defense in cases involving admissibility of blood test evidence, the
claim of unreasonable search and seizure' has also been offered in defense.
It seems to be a fixed rule of law, however, that a citizen who is under arrest
may have his person and immediate surroundings searched, and pertinent
evidence seized by the arresting officer. This would apply directly to com-
pulsory body fluid analyses, since the investigation of drunkenness is in-
varibly preceded by an arrest. The Fourth Amendment, then, seems to
offer no protection to the defendant in cases where he is under arrest.24
Even in the event that the defendant was not under arrest at the time of
the test, the resulting evidence would be admissible in many states not-
withstanding the fact that it was obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment.2 5
Objection via Due Process
The present stand taken by the state courts indicates that if a valid
19People v. Frederick, 109 CalApp.2d 897, 241 P.2d 1039 (1952).
20 State v. Werling, 234 Iowa 1109, 13 N.W.2d 318 (1944).
21 People v. Tucker, 88 CalApp.2d 333, 198 P.2d 941 (1948). In State v. Cram, 176 Ore. 577,
160 P.2d 283 (1945), the evidence was held admissible in spite of an Oregon statute which
excludes blood alcohol tests if forcibly obtained.
2 2 Apodaca v. State, 140 Tex. Cr. 593, 146 S.W.2d 381 (1940).
23 U.S. Constitution, Fourth Amendment, which protects the" persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures . " State contitutions have similar
provisions.
2 4 Contra: U.S. v. Willis, 85 F.Supp. 745 (1949), in which a "stomach pump" was used
over protest in searching for narcotics that had been swallowed by the defendant. The court
held that this was an unreasonable search and seizure, even though an arrest preceded the search.
25 20 A.m. JuR., Evidence, § 394.
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objection to the admission of compulsory blood tests is to be raised, it must
be predicated upon alleged violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 6 If
the facts of the case are such that the court concludes the defendant was
subjected to treatment which "shocks the conscience" and "offends the
decencies of civilized conduct," the evidence may be excluded. This was
the phraseology used by the United States Supreme Court in the much-cited
Rochn 27 case decided in 1951, wherein the actions of state officers in se-
curing evidence were held sufficiently outrageous to constitute a denial of
due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.s
Although the Rochm case is distinguishable in that a "stomach pump"
was used, the reasoning of the Court in reaching their decision may be
influential in trials involving compulsory blood alcohol tests. If this case
stands for condemnation of compulsory invaswn of the interior of the body
solely to secure evidence against the defendant, then, where there is no
consent,29 blood tests are clearly inadmissible. This is apparently the inter-
pretation placed on the Rochm case by the California District Court of
Appeals in reversing a conviction of manslaughter and drunk-driving.30
In this case, a sample of blood was collected from the defendant while she
was unconscious as a result of an auto accident. The sample was taken to
determine the blood type required for a transfusion, but one portion was
subsequently tested for alcoholic content and the results used against the
defendant in the trial. The California Supreme Court, in reverving judg-
ment of the District Court in the same case,' held that due process was
not violated. Their interpretation of the Rochn case was that" brutal
or shocking force exerted to acquire evidence renders void a conviction
based wholly or in part upon the use of such evidence." Evidently, the
Court decided such conduct was absent in this case.
This leaves some doubt as to where the line should be drawn by the
courts in their application of the Rochm doctrine. Where the defendant
vainly objects to the test, but offers no physical resistance, it can scarcely
be said that the officers are "brutal and shocking" in their actions .32 But
26 U.S. Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment, which provides that no State shall "
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law " There is no doubt
that this Amendment, unlike the Fourth and Fifth, requires compliance by all state govern-
ments.
27 Rochm v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1951), the circumstances of which were similar to
the Willis case, supra note 24. The defendant was forced to submit to a "stomach pump" and
the evidence obtained thereby was admitted against him in court.
28 In concurring opinions, Black and Douglas, JJ., stated that the Fifth Amendment was
violated, not the Fourteenth.
29 In People v. Frederick, supra note 19, a case decided after the Rochin decision, the
Court held there was no denial of due process where the jury found consent had been given
to the blood test.
3 0 People v. Haeussler, 248 P.2d 434 (Cal.App. 1952).
3 1 People v. Haeussler, 41 Cal.2d 252, 260 P.2d 8 (1953).
32 People v. Walton, docket no ........., a case now before the U.S. Supreme Court, is likely
to settle this particular question. Walton contends that police violated the Fourteenth Amend-
ment when they rolled up his sleeve and had a technician take a blood sample over his protest.
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the courts may view the case differently where the defendant physically
resists and is overcome by the force and violence of superior numbers. To
draw the line between these cases would be to place a premium upon
resistance.
By establishing the degree of risk as the basic issue, the courts will
encounter difficulties in more than one case. Surely a: man could not law-
fully be forced to submit to a delicate operation in order that a bullet
lodged near his heart might be extracted and used as evidence against him.
Where would the line be drawn between this extreme and the relatively
slight risk involved in a blood test?
In balancing the scales of justice, the protection of individual civil lib-
erties can be lessened with justification only if it can be demonstrated that
the protection of society in the aggregate will be substantially increased.
Perhaps the courts, in balancing the two, will find that compulsory invasion
of the body represents the most equitable place to draw the illusive and
intangible line between proper and improper conduct. Were this line drawn
at the skin, the urine and breath tests' would be made compulsory,4 as
well as the taking of fingerprints, performance of special acts, and other
compulsory examinations. Resistance could be met with force, but only
that amount of force necessary to overcome the resistance. Compelled blood
analyses would be a denial of due process, but leeway could be provided by
ruling that silence could not operate as a protest and that only examina-
tions over protest could be designated as compulsory Where the defendant
consents to a test to determine his blood type, but expressly objects to a
portion of the sample being used for alcoholic analysis, his demand must
be followed, else every injured defendant be subjected to an unnecessary
pre-transfusion test merely to provide the investigators with evidence of
intoxication.
Admittedly, this is rather narrow construction of so broad a safeguard
as the Fourteenth Amendment. There are those who claim that "due pro-
cess," by its very nature, can never be precisely construed, and that it is
error to attempt to predict the path that will be taken by the courts who
wield ths highly flexible tool. Granting that due process is, and should be,
a subjective test, nevertheless, the increasing problem of drunk-driving and
the proportionately increasing use of alcoholic testing devices by the police
require that the law be constantly re-examined and appraised. Only in this
way may it be determined what the law requires of the individual, and
whether the existing law properly maintains the balance of equity and
justice.
3 3 Because of its advantages, the breath test is preferred. (Eg.., there is little chance of
embarrassment.)
MPeople v. Kiss, 125 CalApp.2d 138, 269 P.2d 942 (1954), a recent Califorma decision,
indicates at least partial acceptance of this theory. Though there was evidence that the de-
fendant was required to submit to an Intommeter test through either supposed or real fear of
violence, the test results were admitted in evidence against hin. The appellate court affirmed
the conviction, pointing out that this was not the only evidence of his drunkenness..
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